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Patents do not always promote innovation, particularly when they restrict access to funda-
mental scientific discoveries and the tools of basic research. However, there are legal and 
policy approaches that may help to ameliorate problems associated with patenting these 
sorts of inventions.Patents are intended to promote sci-
ence and innovation by providing a 
reward for invention and an incentive 
for those willing to invest the time and 
money necessary to turn a nascent 
technology into a commercial prod-
uct. Paradoxically, patents accom-
plish this by restricting access to the 
patented technology. Although the 
patent system is inherently a double-
edged sword, we as a society have 
concluded that the incentive benefits 
of patents generally outweigh their 
exclusionary costs. With respect 
to certain technologies, however, 
there is a concern that the negative 
effects of exclusion might outweigh 
any proinnovation justifications for 
the patent grant. In the realm of the 
life sciences, this concern has been 
raised particularly in connection with 
patents on “upstream” inventions, 
that is, patents that claim technolo-
gies associated with basic and early 
stage research and development, as 
opposed to patents covering “down-
stream” commercial products.
Research tools tend to fall within 
the category of upstream inven-
tions. There is no single definition 
for the term “research tool,” but it 
is generally used to describe inputs 
to the R&D process: the methods, 
reagents, and information used in 
biological research. Other exam-
ples of upstream inventions would 
include naturally occurring genetic 
sequences and polymorphisms, sig-
naling pathways, biological markers, 
and the like, many of which might 
also be considered research tools.The upstream invention desig-
nation can also be conferred on 
applied biological discoveries, such 
as the correlation between increased 
homocysteine levels and vitamin 
B deficiency currently at issue in a 
case (LabCorp v. Metabolite) before 
the U.S. Supreme Court. In the 
1980s, researchers at the University 
of Colorado and Columbia University 
discovered a correlation in humans 
between increased levels of homo-
cysteine and a deficiency in certain 
B vitamins. Clearly an important 
and useful discovery, but was this a 
patentable invention? The U.S. Pat-
ent and Trademark Office (“Patent 
Office”) thought so, issuing the inven-
tors a patent in 1990 that claimed 
a method for detecting a vitamin B 
deficiency by assaying body fluids 
for homocysteine and correlating an 
elevated level of homocysteine with 
lack of vitamin B (U.S. Patent No. 
4,940,658). In 2004, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard 
the LabCorp case. It found that the 
patent had been infringed by doctors, 
who used the method for diagnosing 
vitamin B deficiency in patients, and 
held the company (LabCorp) that 
performed the homocysteine assays 
on patient blood vicariously liable for 
the doctors’ infringement (370 F.3d 
1354; Federal Circuit, 2004).
The LabCorp decision has been 
the focus of much criticism from 
those who see it as symptomatic 
of a troubling expansion of the pat-
ent system’s definition of patentable 
subject matter. These critics argue Cell 125that patents were never meant to 
cover the fundamental discover-
ies of basic research, such as the 
relationship between levels of natu-
ral metabolites in the human body. 
Permitting such patents hinders 
research and unnecessarily restricts 
access to technology. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has taken notice of 
the debate, and in a rare move has 
agreed to hear an appeal of the Lab-
Corp decision to address the spe-
cific question of whether the patent 
constitutes an impermissible attempt 
to claim a “natural phenomenon or 
law of nature.” Oral arguments were 
heard on March 12, and a decision is 
expected shortly.
Patents: The Boon or Bane of 
Researchers?
In the past, upstream inventions were 
often not patented, instead enter-
ing directly into the public domain to 
seed future innovation. However, in 
recent years there has been a trend 
toward the patenting of upstream 
technologies. This shift has been 
driven in large part by the increasing 
tendency of universities and other 
research institutions to patent the 
discoveries of their researchers. The 
Bayh-Dole Act, passed by the U.S. 
Congress in 1980, allows universities 
and nonprofit organizations to patent 
and commercialize inventions arising 
out of federally funded research and 
is widely viewed as having promoted 
the large increase in patents granted 
to universities (Rai and Eisenberg, 
2002). The original intent of the Bayh-, May 19, 2006 ©2006 Elsevier Inc. 629
Dole Act was to foster the dissemina-
tion and practical implementation of 
the fruits of federal research. By its 
nature, academic research tends to 
generate predominantly upstream 
inventions, and indeed many of the 
most controversial upstream patents 
have come out of university research. 
These include the University of Wis-
consin patents on human embryonic 
stem cells, the Harvard/MIT/White-
head patent on the master transcrip-
tion factor NF-κB, and the Columbia 
University patents on the cotransfor-
mation process used in the manu-
facture of a number of important 
biotechnology products including 
Epogen for anemia and Activase for 
heart attacks and stroke.
Another trend that is likely to have 
contributed to the increasing number 
of upstream patents has been a dra-
matic expansion of the universe of 
potentially patentable subject matter. 
There was a time when living organ-
isms, computer software, methods of 
doing business, and basic scientific 
discoveries were all generally con-
sidered unpatentable. However, that 
has changed over the last 30 years, 
largely as a result of judicial deci-
sions rather than actions by Con-
gress or the Patent Office. Currently, 
living organisms, naturally occurring 
biomolecules, genetic sequences 
and polymorphisms, and computer-
implemented bioinformatics are all 
being patented.
The Patent Thicket
Upstream patents have been criticized 
on a number of counts. For example, 
it has been proposed that the prolif-
eration of patents covering research 
tools has resulted in a “patent thicket,” 
rendering it virtually impossible to 
conduct biomedical research without 
inadvertently infringing upon a host of 
conflicting patent claims (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998; Rai and Eisenberg, 
2002). Although in theory a researcher 
should be able to license the neces-
sary technology inputs, in practice it 
is generally not feasible owing to the 
large number of different patent hold-
ers, each with their own licensing 
agenda. Some patent holders will not 
even consider licensing their technol-630 Cell 125, May 19, 2006 ©2006 Elsevogy to competitors, and in the U.S., a 
patentee can virtually never be com-
pelled to grant a license.
The problem is exemplified by 
the experience of the developers of 
“golden rice,” a genetically modified 
crop engineered to produce elevated 
levels of vitamin A (Ye et al., 2000). 
The project reportedly required 
access to technology inputs cov-
ered by over 70 different patents, 
and licensing the required intellec-
tual property was viewed as a major 
obstacle to achieving success (RAFI 
communiqué, 2000). In the end, 
the patent owners agreed to freely 
license the necessary technologies, 
probably because golden rice was 
being developed for humanitarian 
purposes to prevent blindness in 
children in the developing world and 
was not considered commercially 
viable. However, one can well imag-
ine that this complex patent land-
scape could constitute a formida-
ble impediment for a biotechnology 
company attempting to develop a 
more commercially relevant recom-
binant product.
Critics charge that the incentive 
effects of research tool patents are 
generally modest, and not offset by 
their substantial tendency to impede 
research and development. Because 
research tools are often the product of 
publicly funded basic research, it can 
be argued that most of these technolo-
gies would have been discovered and 
disclosed to the public with or without 
the incentive of a patent.
One of the primary justifications 
for patents is that they provide the 
necessary incentive for the invest-
ment required to transform a nascent 
patented technology into a practical 
commercial product. A good exam-
ple would be the development of a 
candidate molecule into an FDA-
approved drug. Without the incentive 
provided by a patent, pharmaceuti-
cal companies would be unwilling to 
invest the capital needed to develop 
the molecule into a drug and take it 
through the clinical trials required 
for regulatory approval. Conversely, 
in the case of many research tool 
discoveries, others are able to inte-
grate the technology into their own ier Inc.research without incurring substan-
tial downstream development costs. 
The incentive value of the patent is 
minimal and many would argue does 
not justify the patent’s tendency to 
restrict access.
Some upstream patents cover 
fundamental biological principles, 
which may or may not fall into the 
category of research tool. For exam-
ple, the discovery that NF-κB plays 
an important role in a host of differ-
ent biological processes and signal-
ing pathways was clearly an impor-
tant scientific achievement. But this 
fundamental discovery became the 
basis for a patent purporting to cover 
any and all drugs that act by reduc-
ing NF-κB activity in a cell (Garber, 
2006). Many would argue that it is 
inappropriate to grant a patent for 
such an early stage discovery, when 
so much is left to be done before an 
actual drug can be made available to 
the public. Patents of this type can 
deter other researchers from devel-
oping a drug involving the patented 
pathway, without seeming to provide 
any significant incentive to innova-
tion that would justify the cost.
Although upstream patents have 
been widely criticized, and there are a 
number of cases where specific pat-
ents clearly seem to have impeded 
innovation, there is little objective 
evidence to support a conclusion 
that patents constitute a widespread 
substantial obstacle to biomedical 
R&D, particularly in the academic 
sector. For example, in a recent study 
conducted for the National Academy 
of Sciences by Walsh et al. (2005), 
only about 1% of the 398 academic 
researchers surveyed reported suf-
fering a project delay of more than a 
month due to third party patents on 
research inputs, and none had found 
it necessary to terminate a project. 
Out of 17 industrial researchers who 
responded, the study identified at 
most one case in which a research 
tool patent might have stopped a 
biomedical research project. Many 
researchers reported that they were 
not aware of any patents covering 
tools they used in their research, but 
also that they typically did not check 
for relevant patents.
A Path through the Patent Thicket
A Legal or Policy Solution?
Although the Walsh study suggests 
that upstream patents are per-
haps not as pervasive a problem as 
some might fear, it still seems clear 
that upstream patents can at times 
impede innovation more than they 
promote it. Nevertheless, there are a 
variety of legal and policy approaches 
that could address the problem.
For example, funding agencies 
such as the NIH could require, or at 
least encourage, funding recipients 
to forgo pursuing patents on cer-
tain upstream inventions, or make 
the technologies generally available 
under reasonable terms. This policy 
should particularly be applied to 
upstream inventions that would likely 
be invented and widely disseminated 
even without the incentive of a pat-
ent and technologies that would be 
generally useful as inputs in a variety 
of R&D contexts.
A change in the law might help in 
this regard. Under the Bayh-Dole 
Act, federal funding agencies are 
only allowed to restrict the patenting 
of inventions resulting from funded 
research under “exceptional circum-
stances.” Furthermore, any determi-
nation of “exceptional circumstances” 
is subject to cumbersome adminis-
trative and judicial review processes, 
which are believed to deter agencies 
from exercising this option. Rai and 
Eisenberg (2002) have proposed that 
the law be amended to delete the 
“exceptional circumstances” lan-
guage and to streamline the review 
process, thereby freeing the hands 
of agencies such as the NIH to dis-
courage the patenting of certain 
upstream technologies. However, so 
far there has been no formal move to 
implement such proposals.
Even under the current statutory 
requirements, the NIH has on occa-
sion promoted, and even mandated, 
open access to certain fundamen-
tal technologies, such as genetic 
sequence information. For example, 
in 1999 it published Principles and 
Guidelines for Sharing of Biomedical 
Research Resources, which explicitly 
discourage patents on certain inven-
tions, particularly research tools, because of their tendency to “thwart 
utilization, commercialization, and 
public access” (NIH, 1999). And in a 
number of funding grants relating to 
the human genome project, the NIH 
required that recipients forgo patent 
rights and dedicate genetic sequence 
information to the public domain (T.J. 
Roumel, personal communication).
Another approach to limiting pat-
ents on upstream inventions would 
be to narrow the scope of poten-
tially patentable subject matter. In 
principle, “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are 
not patentable, but many upstream 
patents arguably cover fundamen-
tal biological principles. Examples 
might include claims directed to 
naturally occurring biomolecules, 
genetic sequences, polymorphisms, 
algorithms for analyzing biologi-
cal information, signaling pathways, 
methods of diagnosing a disease 
state based on a biological marker, 
and methods for identifying drugs by 
screening for inhibitors of molecules 
or cellular pathways.
In deciding the LabCorp appeal, the 
Supreme Court could act to restrict 
the patentability of natural principles 
and fundamental discoveries. Thus, 
the decision could have significant 
ramifications for the patenting of 
upstream biological inventions. Con-
gress on the other hand might step 
in at some point and address the 
issue, but as of yet it has shown lit-
tle inclination to rein in the scope of 
patentable subject matter by statute. 
In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit recently held 
that genetic sequences are generally 
not patentable absent the disclosure 
of some specific, practical utility 
associated with the sequence (In re 
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, Federal Cir-
cuit, 2005). That decision was wel-
comed by those concerned about 
the potential negative effects of pat-
ents claiming raw genetic sequence 
information.
Policing “Junk” Patents
The problem of upstream patents 
is exacerbated when patentees are 
permitted to claim subject matter that 
extends well beyond the scope of the 
disclosed invention. Consider, for Cell 125example, a University of Wisconsin 
patent that purports to cover essen-
tially all useful primate embryonic 
stem cell cultures, including human, 
based on the disclosure of one 
method for culturing embryonic stem 
cells from one species of monkey 
(U.S. Patents No. 5,843,780). By law, 
an inventor is only allowed a breadth 
of patent coverage commensurate in 
scope with the disclosed invention, 
but the courts and the Patent Office 
have too often failed to adequately 
enforce this requirement. A more 
vigilant and coherent application of 
the disclosure rules by the courts 
and Patent Office to limit the scope 
of upstream patent claims could 
substantially attenuate the negative 
impact of some of these patents.
Not only are many upstream pat-
ents overly broad, some should 
probably never have been issued in 
the first place. There are a number 
of cases where broad upstream 
patents issued by the Patent Office 
have ultimately been found invalid in 
the courts, but only after expensive, 
time-consuming, and unpredictable 
litigation. An example would be the 
University of Rochester patent pur-
porting to claim the treatment of 
inflammation by specifically inhibit-
ing the COX-2 enzyme, which the 
university unsuccessfully attempted 
to assert against Pfizer for market-
ing its COX-2 inhibitors, Celebrex 
and Bextra (University of Roches-
ter v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 
F.3d 916; Federal Circuit, 2004). 
Fortunately, patent reform legisla-
tion is currently being considered 
that includes provisions intended 
to strengthen the patent examina-
tion process. For example, one 
proposal would permit interested 
third parties to submit references to 
the Patent Office that would assist 
the patent examiner in building a 
case for rejecting overly broad pat-
ent claims and patents claiming 
“inventions” that lack novelty or are 
obvious. Another proposal would 
establish a procedure whereby third 
parties could oppose questionable 
patents in the Patent Office, prior 
to commencement of an infringe-
ment action. The intent is to provide , May 19, 2006 ©2006 Elsevier Inc. 631
a relatively quick and inexpensive 
mechanism to nip improperly issued 
patents in the bud.
An Exemption for Research Use?
A “research use defense” in response 
to allegations of patent infringement 
during the course of research—some-
times called a “research use excep-
tion”—could substantially reduce 
the negative effects of upstream 
patents. Up until a few years ago, 
many researchers were under the 
impression that such a defense 
was available, shielding them from 
liability for incidental patent infringe-
ment incurred during basic research. 
However, in 2002 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals of the Federal Circuit largely 
disabused them of this notion in the 
landmark Madey v. Duke University 
case. The case was brought against 
Duke University by the former direc-
tor of a laser research lab, who had 
been fired. Essentially, Duke Univer-
sity continued to operate the lab using 
technology that the former director 
had invented and independently pat-
ented prior to his employment with 
the university. (This is a far cry from 
the feared scenario where a univer-
sity researcher is sued for inadvert-
ently infringing upon a patent dur-
ing the course of conducting basic 
research.) However, importantly, 
the US Court of Appeals decision 
held that the research use defense 
claimed by Duke University applies 
only to experiments conducted “for 
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, 
or for strictly philosophical inquiry,” 
which generally does not include 
university research (307 F.3d 1351; 
Federal Circuit, 2002).
In 1984, Congress did enact a 
limited research use defense for 
patent infringement that occurs in 
the course of generating data for 
submission to the FDA, sometimes 
referred to as the “Bolar Amend-
ment.” Pharmaceutical companies 
have pushed for an interpretation of 
the defense that would extend far 
back into the R&D process to cover 
even early stage drug discovery. At 
this point, it is not entirely clear to 
what extent the courts would agree 
with this interpretation, although 
the Supreme Court has recently 632 Cell 125, May 19, 2006 ©2006 Elseviheld that the defense does apply to 
at least some preclinical research 
(Merck v. Integra, 125 S.Ct. 2372; 
2005). Although Congress could take 
action and institute a more general 
“research use defense,” previous 
attempts have encountered strong 
resistance, particularly from universi-
ties and the biotechnology industry, 
the groups primarily engaged in the 
patenting and licensing of research 
tools. In view of this strong resist-
ance, the passage of such legislation 
would seem unlikely in the foresee-
able future.
Regardless of the legal status of 
the research use defense, academic 
researchers should take solace from 
the fact that as yet few if any lawsuits 
have been filed for patent infringe-
ment occurring in the context of basic 
academic research. For example, 
although the Madey v. Duke decision 
served to clarify the limited scope of 
the research use defense, the actual 
lawsuit only arose in the context of 
an employment dispute. For a variety 
of practical reasons, it will seldom if 
ever make commercial sense for a 
patent holder to sue a noncommer-
cial academic researcher for patent 
infringement.
Another way to deal with prob-
lematic upstream patents would be 
for the government to compel cer-
tain patent holders to license their 
technologies for use by others. 
Although this approach is used in 
some countries, there has never 
been strong support for compul-
sory licensing in the U.S., where it 
is thought that compulsory licens-
ing would substantially dilute the 
patent right and hence the value of 
a patent as an incentive for inno-
vation. Nevertheless, under cer-
tain scenarios, particularly involv-
ing a serious threat to the public 
health, Congress might require the 
compulsory licensing of key tech-
nologies. For example, in Octo-
ber 2005, U.S. Senator Charles 
Schumer called for the compulsory 
licensing of Roche’s antiviral drug 
Tamiflu because of the perceived 
threat of a pandemic posed by 
the avian flu virus (Schumer Press 
Release, 2005).er Inc.Patents and the Public Domain
Changes in law and government 
policy are not the only avenues for 
addressing the issue of upstream 
patents. One way to preclude patents 
from restricting access to upstream 
technologies is to introduce the tech-
nology into the public domain before 
someone else has a chance to pat-
ent it. For example, fearing that the 
patenting of single-nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNPs) could form a pat-
ent thicket that would impede basic 
research and drug development, 
many of the major drug and life sci-
ence companies banded together 
with the Wellcome Trust to form the 
SNP Consortium, an organization 
with the stated objective of discov-
ering and publishing SNPs in the 
human genome as quickly as pos-
sible and in a manner that precludes 
other parties from patenting them 
(http://snp.cshl.org).
The HapMap International Haplo-
type Mapping Project (http://www.
hapmap.org/cgi-perl /registration) 
took this approach one step further, 
making its human haplotype data 
freely available but requiring anyone 
accessing the data to agree to forgo 
filing product patent applications 
on any invention that relies in part 
on HapMap data. It is not clear how 
effective this approach would be 
because those who manage to gain 
access to the data indirectly would 
probably not be bound by the terms 
of the agreement, but it does show 
some creativity and an awareness of 
the problem.
Of course, a patent is only an 
impediment to research and devel-
opment to the extent that it cannot 
be circumvented; if there are freely 
available alternatives to research 
tools, the problem of the pat-
ent thicket disappears. Thus, one 
approach to clearing the thicket is 
to develop work-around technolo-
gies and make them freely avail-
able on a nonrestricted basis. For 
example, Agrobacterium-mediated 
transformation is one of the most 
widely used methods for introduc-
ing heterologous DNA into plants. 
CAMBIA, a nonprofit group that 
promotes the use of agricultural 
biotechnology to improve nutrition 
and the environment in developing 
countries, determined that the pat-
ent landscape surrounding Agro-
bacterium-mediated transforma-
tion was impeding the development 
of genetically modified crops. They 
responded by developing a work-
around transformation technology 
that does not involve the use of 
Agrobacterium and made the tech-
nology freely available to academic 
and nonprofit research organiza-
tions, or at a nominal cost to for-
profit organizations (Broothaerts et 
al., 2005).
Rather than merely introduc-
ing its technology into the pub-
lic domain, CAMBIA patents it 
and makes it universally available 
under what it refers to as a Bio-
logical Open Source (BiOS) license 
(http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/
BiOS_licenses.html). Licensees are 
free to use the technology and to 
patent any inventions developed 
using the technology, including 
improvements and new applica-
tions of the licensed invention. However, they must agree to make 
any improvements freely available 
to other licensees. CAMBIA asserts 
that this approach is preferable 
to simply putting the technology 
into the public domain because 
third parties can develop and pat-
ent new uses and improvements of 
public domain technology, creat-
ing a “picket fence” of intellectual 
property around the core invention. 
Essentially, open source is a strat-
egy that uses intellectual property 
as a tool to promote rather than 
restrict access to technology.
In conclusion, although we might 
be better off with less patenting 
of upstream inventions, research-
ers will need to deal with upstream 
patents for the foreseeable future. 
Fortunately, in most cases these 
patents will probably act more as 
speed bumps than true obstacles to 
innovation. Nevertheless, there are 
legal, policy, and self-help measures 
that can be taken to alleviate some 
of the most pernicious aspects of 
upstream patents, and these should 
be seriously considered.Cell 125RefeRenCes
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